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where � is the growth rate of per-capita (or per-worker) GDP, , in country j, is a vector of country-specific circumstances determining the long-run income level, is the rate of (conditional) convergence, and is a random shock term.
What goes into are what we might call the "growth fundamentals"-the set of factors that condition long-run income levels. While this set could be quite large in principle, many of the plausible members of the set are also endogenous in the long-run. Typical conditioning variables used in growth regressions such as levels of investment, human capital, and the quality of policies might be all viewed as being ultimately determined, for example, by a country's quality of institutions (as has been argued forcefully by Daron Acemoglu, James
Robinson and assorted co-authors). Or they may be determined by geography and ecology (as has been argued by Jeff Sachs and co-authors). Institutions themselves may be endogenous to initial levels of human capital brought in by colonizers (as has been argued by Glaeser and Shleifer).
For the purposes of the present discussion, I do not need to take a strong stand among these contending perspectives on what the true growth fundamentals are. As long as we leave room for human capital and institutions, I am happy to accept that geography matters too.
African countries cannot do much about their geography, but there is little doubt that their growth fundamentals on all other dimensions have improved significantly. Agricultural markets have been liberalized, domestic markets have been opened up to international trade, parastatals have been rationalized or closed down, macroeconomic stability has been restored, and exchange-rate management is infinitely better than it used to be ( Figure 5 ). Beyond economic governance, political institutions have improved significantly as well, with democracy and electoral competition becoming the norm rather than the exception throughout the continent ( Figure 6 ). Finally, some of the worst military conflicts have ended, reducing the number of civil war casualties in recent years to historic lows for the region (Figure 7 ).
That is all good news for Africa's economic prospects, but how much growth should we expect out of them? The improvement in the policy and institutional environment can be expected to generate greater economic stability and prevent deep crises arising out of 4 mismanagement as in the past. But it is not clear that it provides a significant boost for economic growth, and nor that it acts, on its own, as the engine for a growth miracle. Work by Bill Easterly, myself, and others has shown that the relationship between standard measures of good policy (such as trade liberalization and low inflation) and economic growth is not particularly strong, leaving extreme cases aside. A huge black market premium for foreign currency and hyperinflation can drive an economy to ruin, but there is no predictable or large growth difference between an inflation rate of 5% and 15%, or an average tariff rate of 10% versus 25%. As economists, we have a pretty good idea of what can cause economic collapse, but not so much about what can produce a miracle. The upside potential of these policy reforms remain uncertain as a result.
What about institutions, which have received so much attention in the literature? Isn't it the case that high quality institutions make a huge difference to long-run income levels, and hence convergence patterns? Acemoglu, Gallego, and Robinson (2014) claim that differences in institutional quality account for as much as 75% of the variation in income levels around the world. This is a very big number. And it may well be right for the very long-run. The trouble is that even if it is correct, this long-run relationship tells us rather less about growth prospects over the next decade or two. The empirical relationship between institutions (or the change in the quality thereof) and growth rates tend not to be that strong, unlike what the long-run relationship in levels suggests. Few would deny that Latin America's political and economic institutions have improved significantly over the late 1980s and 1990s. Yet the growth payoff has been meager at best. Conversely, high-performing Asian economies such as South Korea (until the late 1990s) and China (presently) have been rife with institutional shortcomings such as cronyism and corruption and yet have done exceedingly well.
Consider democracy. Despite an extensive empirical literature, the growth effects of democracy still remain in question. The strongest recent statement about the growthpromoting effects of democracy comes from Acemoglu, Naidu, Restrepo, and Robinson (2014) , who find that full democratization produces roughly a 20% increase in GDP per capita over 30 years. This translates to a growth effect of about 0.6 percent per year. This is not an insignificant effect, but it is temporary and phased out over time. And it cannot account for a substantial part of income differences across the world -nothing like the 75% claimed for "institutions" in general.
To get large effects out of institutions, even for the long run, we need to use measures such as the "rule of law" or "expropriation risk." An important problem is that these are outcomes: they tell us something about investors' evaluation of the economic environment, but not so much about how to get there. It remains unclear which policy levers have to be pulled to get those outcomes. Surely what is required is more than passing the relevant laws or regulations. And perhaps those same outcomes can be obtained through institutional forms that look very different than those we associate with the "rule of law" in Western contexts. As I have argued elsewhere, the function that good institutions fulfil (about which we have a fairly good idea) do not map into unique forms (about which we know a lot less) But what is striking is the presence of convergence, in at least certain parts of the economy, even in the absence of good fundamentals.
In , I show that this result is fairly general, regardless of time period, region, or level of aggregation. In particular, the twenty or so African countries which are represented in the UNIDO data set follow the same pattern as the rest of the world ( Figure 9 ). In this respect, Africa is no different. So can Africa generate a growth miracle based on the performance of these manufacturing industries?
Let us first integrate this sectoral convergence result with the conditional convergence framework for the entire economy. Divide the economy into two parts, the modern (or manufacturing) part, with the subscript M, and the rest (or traditional part) with subscript T.
Suppose only the M-sector exhibits unconditional convergence, while the T-sector is subject to conditional convergence as before. Now the growth rate of the economy can be decomposed into three channels:
The first of these is the conditional convergence channel we have looked at before. It depends on the cumulative accumulation of fundamental capabilities, vague as the contents of these may be, as I discussed before. The second channel is convergence within modern industries. Its magnitude depends on the distance from the productivity frontier, the convergence coefficient ( ), the productivity premium in M relative to the economy ( ), and the employment share of M ( ). The third channel is the structural change term, and captures the growth effect of the reallocation of labor from low-productivity sectors (T) to high-productivity sectors (M).
The two new terms can boost growth significantly, and indeed have played a key role in Asian growth miracles. Their quantitative magnitudes depend crucially on the size of the modern/manufacturing sector and its rate of expansion ( , ) -that is, the pace of industrialization. Rapid industrialization produces fast growth into middle-to-upper income status. In the later stages of growth, as industrial convergence runs out of steam, economic progress begins to rely disproportionately on the fundamentals and growth slows down.
This framework produces the following typology of growth patterns.
A typology of growth processes/outcomes Figure 13 , is much more mixed. In both cases, there has been outmigration from agriculture, but the consequences have been less salutary. In Ethiopia, where there has been some growth-promoting structural change, its magnitude is much smaller than in Vietnam. Manufacturing industry, in particular, has expanded much less. In Kenya, meanwhile, structural change has contributed little to growth.
That is because the large number of workers leaving agriculture have been absorbed mainly into services where productivity is apparently not much higher than in traditional agriculture.
The even worse news for African manufacturing is the degree to which it is dominated by small, informal firms that are not particularly productive. The share of formal employment in overall manufacturing employment appears to run as small as 6% in Ethiopia and Senegal ( Figure 14) . Remember that the finding on unconditional convergence applies to formal, organized firms. There is little reason or evidence to believe that informal firms are on the same escalator as modern firms with access to technology, markets, and finance. The evidence on informality suggests few small, informal firms eventually grow out of informality. So informality is a drag on overall productivity, and this plays a large part in explaining why not just services but also manufacturing in Africa has been falling behind the productivity frontier, even in recent years with high growth (Figure 15 ).
To sum up, the African pattern of structural change is very different from the classic pattern that has produced high growth in Asia, and before that, the European industrializers.
Labor is moving out of agriculture and rural areas. But formal manufacturing industries are not the main beneficiary. Urban migrants are being absorbed largely into services that are not particularly productive and into informal activities. The pace of industrialization is much too slow for the convergence dynamics to play out in full force.
High-growth scenarios for Africa
To generate sustained, rapid growth into the future, Africa has essentially four options.
The first one is to revive manufacturing and put industrialization back on track, so as to replicate as much as possible the traditional route to convergence. The second is to generate agriculture-led growth, based on diversification into non-traditional agricultural products. The third is to generate rapid growth in productivity in services, where most of the people will end up in any case. The fourth is growth based on natural resources, in which many African countries are amply endowed. Let me say a few words about each of these scenarios. , Johnson et al. 2010 ).
Of course, achieving and sustaining a competitive/undervalued real exchange rate requires an appropriate monetary/fiscal policy framework. In particular, it requires managing or discouraging capital and aid inflows and a tighter fiscal policy than otherwise. But these macroeconomic policy adjustments may be considerably easier to implement than the endless series of policy reforms needed to fix the individual problems associated with the "poor business climate." Once the economy is on a higher growth path, it may become easier to deal with those problems over time, reducing the reliance on the real exchange rate. The reasons for this common pattern of premature deindustrialization are probably a combination of global demand shifts, global competition, and technological changes. Whatever the reason, Africa finds itself in an environment where it is facing much stronger head winds.
Countries with a head start in manufacturing, having developed a large manufacturing base behind protective walls as in both Europe and Asia, make it difficult for Africa to carve a space for itself, especially as global demand shifts from manufacturing to services. Having liberalized trade, African countries have to compete today with Asian and other exporters not only on world markets, but also in their domestic markets. Earlier industrializers were the product of not just export booms, but also considerable amount of import substitution. Africa is likely to find both processes very difficult, even under the best of circumstances.
What about the second scenario of agriculture-based growth? Since so much of Africa's workforce is still in agriculture, does it not make sense to prioritize agricultural development?
Without question, there are many unexploited opportunities in African agriculture, whether in perishable non-traditional products such as fruits and vegetables or perishable cash crops such as coffee.
Agricultural diversification seems to be hindered by many of the same obstacles as manufacturing. The term "poor business climate" applies equally well here too (e.g., Golub and
Hayat 2014). In addition, agriculture has special problems that governments need to fix, such as extension, land rights, standard setting, and input provision. Once again, the exchange rate can be an important compensatory tool.
The main argument against this scenario is that it is very difficult to identify historical examples of countries that have pulled such a strategy off. Agriculture-led growth implies that countries would sell their agricultural surplus on world markets, and that their export basket would remain heavily biased towards farm products. Yet one of the strongest correlates of economic development is export diversification away from agriculture. It is true that Asian countries such as China and Vietnam have benefited greatly from an early spurt in agricultural productivity -something that is particularly helpful for poverty reduction. But in all cases, the subsequent and more durable boost came from the development of urban industries.
Moreover, even if modern, non-traditional agriculture succeeds on a large scale in Africa, it is unlikely that this will reverse the process of outmigration from the countryside. More capital and technology intensive farming may even accelerate this process. So one way or another African countries will need to develop an array of high productivity sectors outside of agriculture.
The third scenario of growth in service productivity is one that perhaps raises the largest numbers of questions. When I lay out my pessimism on industrialization to audiences familiar with Africa, invariably I hear back a litany of success cases in services -mobile telephony and mobile banking are the most common -that seem to lead to a more optimistic prognosis.
With few exceptions, services traditionally have not acted as an escalator sector like manufacturing. The essential problem is that those services that have the capacity to act as productivity escalators tend to require relatively high skills. The classic case is information technology, which is a modern, tradable service. Long years of education and institution building are required before farm workers can be transformed into programmers or even call center operators. Contrast this with manufacturing where little more than manual dexterity is required to turn a farmer into a production worker in garments or shoes, raising his/her productivity by a factor of two or three.
So raising productivity in services has typically required steady and broad-based accumulation of capabilities in human capital, institutions, and governance. Unlike in manufacturing, technologies in most services seem less tradable and more context-specific (again with some exceptions such as cell phones). And achieving significant productivity gains seems to depend on complementarities across different policy domains. For example, productivity gains in a narrow segment of retailing can be accomplished relatively easily by letting foreign firms such as Walmart or Carrefour come in. But achieving productivity gains along the entire retail sector is extremely difficult in view of the heterogeneity of organizational forms and the range of prerequisites across different segments.
None of this is to say that the past will necessarily look like the future. Perhaps Africa will be the breeding ground of new technologies that will revolutionize services for broad masses, and do so in a way that creates high-wage jobs for all. Perhaps. But it is too early to be confident about the likelihood of this scenario.
14 Finally, what about natural resource based growth? Once again, the argument against this scenario has to be the paucity of relevant examples in history. Almost all of the countries that have grown rapidly (say at 4.5% per annum) over a period of three decades or more have done so by industrializing ). In the post-World War II period, there were two such waves of countries, one in the European periphery (Spain, Portugal, Italy, etc.) and one in Asia (Korea, Taiwan, China, etc.) Very few countries could achieve such a performance based on natural resources, and those that did were typically very small countries with unusual circumstances. Three of these countries were in Sub-Saharan Africa: Bostwana, Cape Verde, and Equatorial Guinea. What these countries demonstrate is that it is indeed possible to grow rapidly if you are exceptionally rich in minerals and fuels. But it would be a stretch of the imagination to think that these countries set a relevant or useful example for countries such as Nigeria and Zambia, let alone Ethiopia and Kenya.
The downsides of natural resource based growth patterns are well known. Resource sectors tend to be highly capital intensive and absorb little labor, creating enclaves within economies. This is one reason why small economies can generally do better with resource windfalls. Resource booms crowd out other tradables, preventing industries with escalator properties from getting off the ground. Resource rich economies experience substantial volatility in their terms of trade. And they have great difficulty in managing/sharing resource rents. Institutional underdevelopment is often the price paid for resource riches. All these factors help account for why resource based growth has not paid off for most countries.
Is an African growth miracle possible?
The balance of the evidence I have reviewed here suggests caution on the prospects for high growth in Africa. Much of the recent performance seems to be due to temporary boosts:
an advantageous external context and making up of lost ground after a long period of economic decline. While the region's fundamentals have improved, the payoffs to macroeconomic stability and improved governance are mainly to foster resilience and lay the groundwork for growth, rather than to ignite and sustain rapid productivity growth. The traditional engines 15 behind rapid growth and convergence, structural change and industrialization, are operating at less than full power.
So my baseline would be that we should expect moderate and steady growth, perhaps as much as 2 percent per capita, as long as the external environment does not deteriorate significantly and China manages its own substantial challenges well. I hasten to point out that a growth rate of 2 percent on a sustained basis is not bad at all. In all likelihood, this will also produce some convergence with the more advanced economies, largely because the latter will not do very well in the decades ahead. My story is not one of Afro-pessimism, but one of curbing our enthusiasm, as Oliver Sabot aptly summarized at the dinner following my lecture.
I can make one other prediction, perhaps one that I feel even more confident about. If
African countries do achieve growth rates substantially higher than what I have surmised, they will do so pursuing a growth model that is different from earlier miracles based on industrialization. Perhaps it will be agriculture-led growth. Perhaps it will be services. But it will look quite different than what we have seen before. 1965-2005, decadal Notes: For RHS chart, variable on the vertical axis is growth of GDP per worker over four separate decades (1965-1975, 1975-1985, 1985-1995, 1995-2005) , controlling for decadal fixed effects. Source: , using data from Maddison (2010) and PWT 7.0 (2011) . There is unconditional convergence --in (formal) manufacturing industries Notes: Vertical axis represents growth in labor productivity over subsequent decade (controlling for period fixed effects). Data are for the latest 10-year period available. Source: Figure 8 African manufacturing seems no different Sub-Saharan Africa: 20 countries Full sample: 115 countries Each observation represents a 2-digit manufacturing industry, for the latest 10 year period for which data are available. The horizontal axis is the log of VA per worker in base period, and the vertical axis is its growth rate over the subsequent decade. Period, industry, and period x industry controls are included. TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA  TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA  TZA TZA TZA  TZA TZA  TZA  TZA  TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA  TZA  TZA TZA  TZA TZA  TZA  TZA  TZA  TZA TZA  TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THATHA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA   THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA   THA  THA THA THA THA THA THA THA THA  TWN TWN   TWN TWN  TWN TWN TWN   TWN  TWN   TWN  TWN TWN TWN  TWN TWN  TWN  TWN TWN TWN TWN TWN  TWN TWN TWN TWN TWN TWN  TWN  TWN TWN  TWN TWN TWN TWN  TWN TWN TWN TWN  TWN TWN TWN TZA  TZA TZA TZA TZA  TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA   TZA TZA  TZA  TZA TZA  TZA  TZA  TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA  TZA  TZA TZA  TZA TZA  TZA  TZA  TZA  TZA TZA  TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA TZA Difference in coverage between two data sets: GGDC (which covers informal employment) and UNIDO (which is mostly formal, registered firms)
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